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must be in the negative. The language and decision of the present case indi-
cate that the court will not extend its jurisdiction beyond the particular fact
situation, but as Mr. Justice Frankfurter, dissenting, ironically observes:
"But legal doctrines have, in an odd kind of way, the faculty of self-generating
extension." 7
If the present case proves to be as narrow as it purports, there remain
the other slow, expensive, and perhaps inappropriate remedies proposed to
solve the multiple tax domicil problem. In the face of such alternatives
as to remedy, it appears that the wealthy "traveler" can well profit by exer-
cising the greatest of care in creating this important jurisdictional fact of
domicil. The present case offers an elucidation of the elements that are
universally accepted as controlling: "Residence in fact coupled with purpose
to make place of residence one's home, are the essential elements of domicile,"
states Mr. Justice Stone.
From the practical standpoint the wealthy wise will save his estate expense
and uncertainty by establishing beyond doubt his domicil in one state; whereas
the estates of those who are not so fortunate will have to bear the expense of
litigation in which the present case will give at least a possible avenue of
escape from the heavy burden of multiple taxation. L. N. M.
WILLS-POWER OF APPOINTMENT-EXERCISE OF THE PowER.-Testator died
leaving two children to whom he devised his estate in equal shares; he
gave his son's share outright, but the share of the daughter he devised in
trust for her use during her life, and upon her death, he ordered the trustees
to "pay and divide the principal of such share to and among such of her
children . . . as she shall by her will appoint." Upon failure effectually to
exercise the power, the property was to go over to her children in equal
shares. The daughter thereafter died leaving two children and she attempted
by will to exercise the power of appointment by creating separate trusts for
her children during life with power of appointment in the children. The
decree of the lower court holding this a valid exercise of the power was
reversed on appeal since the power was held to be limited and special and
could be effectively exercised only in the way provided by the testator. In re
Kennedy's Will (N. Y. 1938), 18 N. E. (2d) 146.
The general rule, with which this note is concerned, goes back to the
early seventeenth century and provides that "under a general power to
appoint, or a power to appoint limited merely as to the objects, the donee
is not restricted to an appointment in fee simple, but may appoint lesser or
and established a shadow of domicil in three or more states. This result
protects those who are the more elaborate rovers. It would seem that the
result is 'unfortunate. Perhaps, therefore, the court will be liberal in finding
an injury threatened to the state; thereby circumventing the result of
Worchester County Tr. Co. v. Riley (1937), 302 U. S. 392, 82 L. ed. 268,
58 Sup. Ct. 185.
7 Mr. Justice Frankfurter comments on the extent of the holding in the
present case thus: "To find decedent could not on self-serving grounds elect
to make his home in Texas 'where he in fact had no residence' and yet to
retain the bill and dispose of it on its merits amounts in effect to a declaration
of rights on behalf of the estate which could not be adjudicated otherwise
than through the screen of a controversy between states."
RECENT CASE NOTES
qualified estates in the subject matter; but if the power expressly or by clear
implication requires that an estate in fee, and no other, shall be appointed,
a less estate than a fee cannot be given by the donee'l
It is clear that an appointment of a lesser estate under a will permitting
the donee to appoint a fee or a less estate,2 or in such parts or shares3 as he
directs, will be held a valid execution of the power unless the will limits
the appointment to a class and there is only one of the class remaining.4
The difficulty has arisen in those cases in which there is no direct authority
given the donee of the power to appoint an estate less than a fee. In this
situation however, cases have upheld the appointment of a lesser estate.5
The theory upon which the courts sustain such appointments is usually said
to be that the lesser is included in the greater, and that the appointment
of a lesser estate is not an excessive exercise of the power, but a partial
execution of it.6 Courts have permitted this appointment of a lesser estate
%ince the early English case of Boviey v'. Smith7 which held, "Where a man
has a power of appointing a fee, he may execute it at several times, and
appoint an estate for life at one time, and the fee at another time." The
rule found expression again in the case of Stark v. Dakyns,8 in which the
court said, "An absolute interest might have been conferred, and it was
equally competent to a person exercising the power to give something short of
an absolute interest."
In those cases which refused the granting of a lesser estate, it seems
that the courts have denied the validity of such appointments not because
there was no authority to grant a lesser estate, despite language which might
lead to such belief, but rather because of one of several other factors. These
factors, relating generally to an appointment outside a designated class,
may be found in four aspects, (1) an appointment of the lesser estate to
members of the class but a remainder in fee to persons not within the class, 9
(2) appointment of a prior interest to persons not within the class,10 (3)
creation of a trust in trustees not within the class,"1 and (4) the creation
149 C. J. 1267, § 55.
2 Hillen v. Iselin (1895), 144 N. Y. 365, 39 N. E. 368.
3 Appleton's Appeal (1890), 136 Pa. St. 354, 20 A. 521, 11 L. R. A. 85;
Beardsley v. Hotchkiss (1884), 96 N. Y. 201; Harker v. Reilly (1871),
4 Del. Ch. 72.
4 Appeal of Pepper (1888), 120 Pa. 235, 13 A. 929; Wickersham v. Savage
(1868), 58 Pa. St. 365.
5 See Mays v. Beech (1905), 114 Tenn. 544, 86 S. W. 713, 4 Ann. Cas.
1189, which upheld an appointment of a life estate coupled with a power
of appointment under wording of the donor's will which granted donee the
power to appoint by will, the passing of the property "to be effective to pass
the title as absolutely as he (donor) could by will."
See also Butler v. Huestis (1873), 68 Ill. 594, 18 Ann. Rep. 589, in which
the court upheld an appointment of a life estate with a remainder in fee where
the will stated that the "real estate shall belong, in fee simple absolute, to such
person as she shall have appointed by her will."
O Mays v. Beech (1905), 114 Tenn. 544, 86 S. W. 713, 4 Ann. Cas. 1139.
7 (1682), 1 Vern. 84, 23 Eng. Repr. 328.
8 (1874), L. R. 10 Ch. App. 35.
9 Wickersham v. Savage (1868), 58 Pa. St. 365.
lO In re Rafferty's Estate (1924), 281 Pa. 325, 126 A. 796.
11 Myers v. Safe Deposit & Trust Co. (1891), 73 Md. 413, 21 A. 58.
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of a trust to accomplish an object that is not within the terms of the power.12
These cases all -proceed upon the theory that the power, exercised to give
to those outside a class, is not exercised so as to fulfill the intention of the
testator. It is true that the court often speaks as if the mere grant of a lesser
estate is the voiding act,1 3 but there is always present the designated class
factor, and it is seriously doubted that the same result would have been
reached had there been no limitation to a class.
It has been held that the mere fact that a trust was created would not
invalidate the exercise of the power where the donee could appoint the fee
in such parts or shares as he should direct.1 4 It would seem, on the basis
of Mays v. Beech,1 5 that a valid exercise should be declared even where the
trust is created in the absence of words expressly permitting the creation
of lesser estates, and this even though the trustees are persons outside a desig-
nated class, so long as the trustee has only limited powers of management,16
for such trustee does not effectively remove control of the property or en-
joyment of the property from the selected beneficiary so as to violate the
intention of the testator.
In the instant case, the donee attempted to exercise the power of appoint-
ment by directing that the property be placed in the hands of trustees who
were to pay the income to the appointee during life and thereafter to divide
the principal and pay to the appointee's children for certain purposes as the
appointee may direct, the remainder to his children in equal shares. This is
certainly a limited power of management in the trustee. Thus, insofar as
the mere creation of the trust is concerned, it would seem that there was a
12 Boyle's Estate (1878), 5 W. N. 363.
13 See Myers v. Safe Deposit & Trust Co. (1891), 73 Md. 413, 21 A. 58,
in which the court says, "He gives the wife the simple power to name who
shall take the estate, and she is given no power by implication to create a trust."
See further Wickersham v. Savage (1868), 58 Pa. St. 365, in which the court
said, "The authority to appoint . . . would not authorize the appointor to
cut down the quantities of estate to the class of designated appointees."
14 In Appleton's Appeal (1890), 136 Pa. St. 354, 20 A. 521, 11 L. R. A. 85,
we find this quotation: "The power is wholly unrestricted: the entire discretion
is committed to the donee of the power, to grant the fee in such form and to
such persons as she chose. In the exercise of that power she did appoint the
fee, and we think she was authorized . . . to declare such uses and trusts
for life as would best carry out her wishes with respect to the ultimate disposal
of the property."
And in Boyle's Estate (1878), 5 W. N. 363, the court says, "Nor does the
mere fact that a trust is created affect the validity of the appointment, where
such trust really effectuates the intention of the donor by confining the benefits
to the selected objects. Where the appointment is to be exercised in such
manner as the donee pleases, the power to create a trust is said to be still
clearer."
15 (1905), 114 Tenn. 544, 86 S. W. 713, 4 Ann. Cas. 1189.
16 The trustee should have only power to collect rents and profits, pay
over to the beneficiary, and transfer title according to direction of the bene-
ficiary. Of course, gefieral powers of management which would permit the
trustee to invest and reinvest, and to dispose of the trust property would give
the trustee such control that he could, by the exercise of this power, defeat the
intent of the testator as to the use and disposal of the property and this should
be invalid.
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valid exercise of the power. However, the court is entirely correct in its
holding since there was not a compliance with the mandate of the testator
to "pay and divide the principal . . . among . . . her children" by
paying to a trustee for the use and benefit of such children.
In order to protect the intent of the testator, it would seem that yet
another- factor has had influence upon the courts, namely, the final disposition
of the property. In those cases in which the exercise of the power was held
invalid, the property was distributed according to the provision of the will
of the testator, chiefly to those who would take under the law of descent.
This operated, in most cases, to keep the property for the benefit of the family
rather than permitting it to go to someone outside the family.17 It will also
be noted that in those cases permitting the creation of an estate less than a
fee, the property went into the hands of those or some of those who had
been selected by the testator to take the property in default of the exercise
of the power.1 8
It is submitted that the proper test of the validity of the creation of a
lesser estate under a power to appoint a fee is whether the disposition thus
made is consistent with the intention of the testator in conferring the power
of appointment. In the language of the cases herein reviewed, there should
be only three instances1 9 in which the exercise of the power to appoint a fee
should be held invalid when a lesser estate is appointed. These instances
should be limited to those cases (1) in which a trustee, having general powers
of management, might be able, by disposal of the property, to prevent those
persons indicated by testator's will from obtaining the property, or (2) in
which there has been a designation of a particular class and the appointment
either of a present or future estate is to someone outside the class, or (3) in
which there is express designation that the donee of the power shall have
only the power to grant a fee. H. M. K.
17 Appeal of Pepper (1888), 120 Pa. 235, 13 A. 929. To trustees outside
a class: Horowitz v. Norris (1865), 49 Pa. St. 213.
See also: Myers v. Safe Deposit & Trust Co. (1891), 73 Md. 413, 21 A. 58;
Wickersham v. Savage (1868), 58 Pa. St. 365.
18 Butler v. Huestis (1873), 68 I1. 594, 18 Am. Rep. 589; Guild v. Newark
(1916), 87 N. J. 38, 99 A. 120; Appleton's Appeal (1890), 136 Pa. St. 354,
20 A. 521, 11 L. R. A. 85; Mays v. Beech (1905), 114 Tenn. 544, 86 S. W. 713,
4 Ann. Cas. 1189; Slark v. Dakyns (1874), L. R. 10 Ch. App. 35.
19 It may here be noted that the exercise of the power of appointment in
such manner so as to violate the rule against perpetuities is a fourth instance
but that it is not included in this note. That question is important in the
subject of this note, but it is independent in its operation; however, the reader
must be ever aware of the existence of this difficult problem and its application
to the situation dealt with in the body of the note.
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